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ABSTRACT
We solve the equilibrium market structure in a labor market where
vacancies and unemployed workers can meet either in an
intermediated market where wages are determined by take-it-or-
l e a v e - i t  o f f e r s ,  o r  i n  a  d i r e c t e d  s e a r c h  m a r k e t  w h e r e  f i r m s  p o s t
w a g e s .  B y  u s i n g  a n  i n t e r m ed i a ry  a g en t s  a v o i d  t h e  c o o r d i n a t i o n
p r o b l e m  w h i c h  p r e v a i l s  i n  t h e  s e a r c h  m a r k e t .  W e  s t u d y  a
monopolistic intermediary and perfect competition between
intermediaries, and we consider the welfare properties of an
intermediary institution, compared to an economy with an
uncoordinated search process only.
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Unemployment persists in equilibrium partly because there is friction in the meetings
between vacancies and unemployed job seekers. One of the sources of friction is lack of
coordination in search activity between job seekers, leading to random distribution of
job applications. Not all the job-seeking activity takes place in a decentralized search
market: some of the employment relationships are formed by using intermediaries (private
or government agencies). The services of public employment agencies are mainly free
for job seekers as well as for employers. They oﬀer also special services to ﬁrms for a
commission fee. Private employment agencies typically charge ﬁrms a commission fee if
they can ﬁll the vacancy but oﬀer their services to workers without charge. The most
important roles of intermediaries according to Spulber (1996a) are “setting prices and
clearing markets; providing liquidity and immediacy; coordinating buyers and sellers;
and guaranteeing quality and monitoring performance”.
We study a labor market where an intermediary (either a monopolistic or competitive)
coordinates the matching of vacancies and unemployed workers. In equilibrium it provides
immediacy to vacancies. Firms and workers participate in a coordinated market (use
the services of the intermediary) or in a search market. In the coordinated market an
intermediary pairs vacancies and workers and charges a commission fee from vacancies if
it can allocate them a worker. Workers can use intermediary’s services for free. Wages
are determined by take-it-or-leave-it oﬀe r sm a d eb ye i t h e rﬁrms or workers. This is a
natural choice in bilateral meetings when both parties have an option to go to the search
market. The rest of the matches form in a search market where vacancies post wages
publicly, and job seekers choose which vacancy to contact, without coordinating their
choices.
The main contribution of this article is that we solve the equilibrium market structure
as a function of unemployment-vacancy ratio. In equilibrium not all the vacancies choose
the coordinated market and consequently, some of the meetings take place in a search
market. Therefore the intermediary cannot extract all the available rents (see also Gehrig,
1993, p. 107). For unemployment-vacancy ratios smaller (larger) than one, the larger
(smaller) the ratio the larger the relative size of the coordinated market. We show that
introducing an intermediary into a search market increases the number of matches, and
it beneﬁts the short side of the market and hurts the long side. The reason for the latter
is that the unemployment-vacancy ratio in the search market (which acts as an outside
option) changes in favor of the short side, and the improvement of the outside option
improves the position of the short side in the coordinated market. If the number of ﬁrms
is determined by zero-proﬁt condition, the equilibrium market structure is non-monotone
in the ﬁrms’ entry cost.
Intermediaries have been studied in two diﬀerent roles: as market makers and match-
makers. Market makers buy commodities from sellers and resell them to buyers (e.g.
retailers, used car dealers). In Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) there is an endogenous
number of market makers, and buyers and sellers are homogeneous. An intermediated
market and a search market coexist because matching probability in the former is as-
sumed to be higher than in the latter. Gehrig (1993) shows that when a monopolistic
market maker sets bid and ask prices, agents with large gains from trade deal with the
1intermediary, and agents with low gains from trade go to search market. Yavas (1996)
generalizes Gehrig’s model by endogenizing search intensities, allowing traders to go to
the intermediary if they fail to trade in the search market, and assuming that the inter-
mediary has an ability to provide immediate service. As a result, buyers and sellers with
high or low gains from trade use the intermediary whereas agents with moderate gains
from trade choose the search market. Spulber (1996b) studies a dynamic model with
heterogeneous consumers and suppliers and price setting market makers. He compares
the market equilibrium in the case of competing market makers with the equilibrium in
the traditional supply and demand model. The basic reason for a positive number of
active market makers in equilibrium is that they can decrease the time cost in searching.
In Shevchenko (2004) there is an endogenous number of middlemen who choose the num-
ber of goods they store. Biglaiser (1993) emphasizes intermediary’s incentive to invest
i nb e c o m i n ga ne x p e r to ng o o d sh es e l l sb e c a u s eh eb u y sm o r eg o o d st h a na ni n d i v i d u a l
buyer. Concerns about reputation gives an intermediary a larger incentive (compared
with sellers) to give buyers correct information about the quality of goods. Miao (2006)
considers a model where heterogenous buyers and homogenous sellers choose between a
centralized market where market makers publicly post bid and ask prices, and a decen-
tralized market where the terms of trade are determined by Nash bargaining. Opening
a centralized market does not necessarily improve social welfare since trading in there
is assumed to have a cost, and it makes the decentralized market tighter which makes
buyers there worse oﬀ.
Matchmakers do not trade but they match the trading partners (e.g. employment
and matrimonial agencies, real estate brokers). This is the setting in the present arti-
cle. In Yavas (1994) heterogeneous buyers and sellers choose search intensities, and a
monopolistic matchmaker sets a commission fee which is proportional to trading sur-
pluses. He shows that buyers with low valuation and sellers with high valuation choose
the matchmaker, and the other agents choose the search market. Bloch and Ryder (2000)
study especially the eﬀects of two diﬀerent pricing schemes for the matchmaker. When
the matchmaker charges a uniform fee from all agents, only the agents with high gains
from trade choose the intermediated market. On the other hand, when the fee is pro-
portional to the trading surplus, only the agents with low gains from trade choose the
intermediated market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider a model with a
ﬁxed number of ﬁrms and workers, and we solve the market structure - the proportion of
ﬁrms that chooses the coordinated market - as a function of unemployment-vacancy ratio
θ and the oﬀer-making probability α.I nS e c t i o n3w ea n a l y z eam o d e lw h e r et h en u m b e r
of ﬁrms is determined by free entry. In Section 4 we consider a model where there
is Bertrand competition between intermediaries. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix
contains veriﬁcations of the second-order conditions for market structure.
22 Monopolistic Intermediary and Fixed Number of
Firms
The economy is populated by a large number u of unemployed workers, a large number
v of vacancies, and an intermediary. Let θ ≡ u/v.E a c h m a t c h e d ﬁrm-worker pair
produces a unit output. We consider a static model1 where agents make their choices in
the following stages: (1) The intermediary announces fee f it charges from ﬁrms which
manage to hire an applicant. (2) Fraction ρ of the ﬁrms register with the intermediary,
that is, they choose the coordinated market. (3) All workers go to the intermediary
who forms as many ﬁrm-worker pairs as possible. (4) The ﬁrms who did not choose the
coordinated market go to search market and post a wage. (5) In the coordinated market,
a ﬁrm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer with probability α ∈ [0,1], and the worker makes
an oﬀer with probability 1 − α. If the respondent rejects the oﬀer, the ﬁrm and the
worker go to the search market. (6) The workers who were left without a partner in the
coordinated market and those who did not reach an agreement in the coordinated market
search among the ﬁrms who posted wages. (7) Matches are formed in the search market,
and ﬁr m sp a yt h ew a g et h e yp o s t e d .
In analyzing the search market we thus utilize the standard urn-ball model where va-
cancies represent the urns and unemployed represent the balls. Suppose that the vacan-
cies are identical and the unemployed observe them all. Each of the unemployed chooses
one vacancy at random. The number of unemployed that chooses a given vacancy is then
binomially distributed. We assume that u and v are very large, and we approximate
the binomial distribution by Poisson distribution. Denoting the unemployment-vacancy
ratio in the search market by σ, the matching probability for a ﬁrm is 1 − e−σ,a n df o r
aw o r k e ri ti s(1 − e−σ)/σ.W h e n m a k i n g o ﬀers in the coordinated market the agents
take into account the possibility that the respondent rejects the oﬀer and both go to the
search market. The value of this option determines the equilibrium oﬀers.
We solve the market structure - the proportion of ﬁrms that chooses the coordinated
market - as a function of unemployment-vacancy ratio θ and the oﬀer-making probabil-
ity α. W ea l s oe x a m i n et h ee ﬃciency of the intermediary institution, and the utilities
accruing to agents, and we compare them to an economy without an intermediary.
Consider ﬁrst the outcomes in the search market. They are determined by unemployment-
vacancy ratio σ in that market, which depends on the overall unemployment ratio θ and
the fraction of ﬁrms which choose the coordinated market. But ﬁr s tw et a k et h ev a l u eo f
σ as given. In the search market each ﬁrm posts a wage ws in order to attract workers,
taking all other ﬁrms’ wages as given. The unemployed observe all the wages and choose
ﬁrms. A larger wage decreases ex post proﬁt but it attracts more applicants. We consider
1One could consider a dynamic model where agents remain in the market until they ﬁnd partners,
and employer-employee relationships break down with some probability. This is likely to be a tedious
exercise, and we doubt whether it brings any new insights compared to a static model.
3a symmetric Nash equilibrium in wages. Following Kultti (1999)2 we have
ws =
σe−σ
1 − e−σ. (1)
The probability for a worker to be hired in the search market is (1 − e−σ)/σ,a n dt h e
expected utility Us of a worker in the search market is ws (1 − e−σ)/σ,t h a ti s ,
Us = e
−σ. (2)
The expected utility of a ﬁrm in the search market is Vs =( 1− e−σ)(1− ws) where




The value of σ is determined by θ and ρ ∈ (0,1) which is the fraction of ﬁrms which
choose the coordinated market. Assume ﬁrst that θ ≥ 1. T h i si m p l i e st h a tρv ≤ u,
and the intermediary assigns a worker to all the ﬁrms in the coordinated market. The
numbers of workers and ﬁr m sw h og ot ot h es e a r c hm a r k e ta r eu − ρv and (1 − ρ)v,





If θ>1,t h e nσ>θ .
If θ<1, we consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case ρ>θ , in other words, ρv > u.
All workers meet a ﬁrm in the coordinated market but some ﬁrms fail to meet a worker.
Suppose a ﬁrm and a worker meet, and either of them makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer.
If it is rejected, they go to the search market. As in the case where θ>1 we assume that
only one agent deviates by making an oﬀer which the respondent rejects. In the search
m a r k e tt h e r ei sn o wo n ew o r k e ra n dm a n yv a c a n c i e s-t h o s ew h i c hc h o s et h es e a r c hm a r k e t
in the ﬁrst place and those which failed to meet a worker in the coordinated market. Then
the equilibrium wage the ﬁrms oﬀer is equal to one, and therefore Vs =0 .A l s o ,Vc = −f
because the only wage oﬀer a worker would accept in the coordinated market is equal to
one. But then no ﬁrm would choose the coordinated market. We conclude that if ρ>θ ,
the coordinated market does not exist. For now on, we assume that ρ<θ . This implies
that by going to coordinated market a vacancy guarantees itself an immediate match
with a worker, as in the case where θ>1. The job seeker - vacancy ratio in the search
market is given by (4), but now σ<θ .
In the coordinated market either a ﬁrm or a worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer.
We can think that in every meeting the proposer is drawn at random, or that proportion α
of ﬁrms always propose and proportion 1−α of ﬁrms let the worker propose. If a proposal
2The idea of the proof is to consider a subset of ﬁr m st h a td e v i a t e sb yp o s t i n gw0
s instead of ws posted
by all other ﬁrms, and a subset of workers who choose the deviating ﬁrms. Then we let the sizes of the
subsets to approach zero.
3The same utilities result if workers send applications and make wage demands with a mixed strategy
(Halko, Kultti and Virrankoski, 2008).
4is rejected, we assume that both of the agents go to the search market. Suppose that a
single ﬁrm deviates and makes an oﬀer which the worker rejects. Because the number of
both agents in the search market is large and this pool is augmented by only one worker
and one ﬁrm, the Poisson parameter σ in the search market remains unchanged. The
expected value of a ﬁrm is then ˆ Vc = −f +1− e−σ − σe−σ <V s . The worker does not
accept an oﬀer lower than his outside option, e−σ,a n dt h eﬁrm does not accept an oﬀer
lower than its outside option, 1 − e−σ − σe−σ.T h eﬁr m ’ se x p e c t e dv a l u ei st h u s










= −f +1− (1 + (1 − α)σ)e
−σ.
If the ﬁrm proposes, it oﬀers the worker e−σ which is acceped, and if the worker proposes,
he oﬀers the ﬁrm 1 − e−σ − σe−σ which it accepts. If both markets exist in equilibrium,
then Vc = Vs ⇒ f = ασe−σ.




























where ρ/θ is the probability that the worker is hired in the coordinated market. If the
worker fails to be hired in there, he goes to the search market and receives utility Us.
The intermediary maximizes proﬁt π = ρvf by choosing f conditional on Vc = Vs.
By (4) and f = ασe−σ,c h o o s i n gf is equivalent to choosing ρ. Further, maximizing ρvf














In Figure 1, curve π = ρvf is the intermediary’s isoproﬁt curve. The further right it
lies the larger the proﬁt. The other curve is the vacancies’ indiﬀerence curve given by
Vc = Vs. If the intermediary chooses from the left of the indiﬀerence curve, vacancies are
strictly better oﬀ by choosing the coordinated market, and the intermediary can increase
f. If the intermediary chooses from the right of the indiﬀerence curve, vacancies are
strictly better oﬀ in the search market.





1+ρ2 − (1 − ρ)
p
1+2 ρ − 3ρ2
´
,(ii) If θ>1, the equilibrium market struc-




1+ρ2 +( 1− ρ)
p
1+2 ρ − 3ρ2
´
,
Proof. The ﬁrst-order condition of (7) is θ−ρθ
2−2ρ+2ρ2+θρ2−ρ3 =0 , which has
two solutions. Appendices A1 and A2 verify that the second-order condition is satisﬁed.
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Figure 1: The intermediary’s proﬁt maximization subject to vacancies’ indiﬀerence be-
tween coordinated market and search market
The fraction of ﬁrms that participates in the coordinated submarket is increasing in
θ if θ<1, and it is decreasing in θ if θ>1. Diﬀerentiating Vc and Vs with respect to θ,
keeping ρ and c constant, results in ∂Vc/∂θ = e−σ/(1 − ρ) and ∂Vs/∂θ = σe−σ/(1 − ρ).
If σ<1,w h i c hh o l d si fθ<1,t h e n∂Vs/∂θ < ∂Vc/∂θ. The equality of the utilities is
restored only if there are less ﬁrms in the search market and more in the coordinated
market, that is, if ρ increases. If σ>1,w h i c hh o l d si fθ>1,t h e n∂Vs/∂θ > ∂Vc/∂θ.
The equality of the utilities is restored only if ρ decreases.
If θ =1 , Proposition 1 implies that ρ =1 .I fa no ﬀer is rejected, both go to the search
market where they would be the only agents. The worker will accept any nonnegative
wage the ﬁrm posts. Therefore Vs =1 . Also, in the coordinated market the worker will
accept any non-negative wage. Then Vc = −f +1. If the intermediary charges f>0,
the ﬁrm goes to the search market right away and gets Vs =1because there would be
one worker, the one who did not match in the coordinated market because it lacks this
particular ﬁrm. Therefore f =0if ρ =1 . If θ =1 ,a n dρ → 1,t h e nb o t hm a r k e t se x i s t
and the intermediary makes a positive proﬁt.
Figure 2 summarizes how the equilibrium market structure depends on the unemployment-
vacancy ratio. When it increases, the proportion of ﬁrms that chooses the coordinated
market ﬁrst increases (until u/v is arbitrarily close to one), and then it decreases.








size of coordinated market
Figure 2: Equilibrium market structure as function of unemployment-vacancy ratio.
2.1 Welfare Analysis I
We note that dV/dθ > 0 and dU/dθ < 0 by using (4) and the results for the equilibrium
market structure. The probability α for ﬁrms making oﬀers in the coordinated market
does not aﬀect the market structure. It can be seen from (8) and indiﬀerence condition
Vc = Vs that α does not aﬀect ﬁrms’ utility. Equation (6) tells that worker’s utility is
larger the smaller is ﬁrms’ probability of making oﬀers.
Let us next compare the outcomes of the economy with the intermediary to outcomes
of pure search economy - an economy which has only a search market with wage posting.
L e tt h ev a l u eo fθ be the same in the two cases. Subscript p denotes the pure search econ-
omy, and s and c denote the search submarket and coordinated submarket, respectively,
in the economy with an intermediary. The absence of a subscript denotes the economy
with an intermediary, comprising of the two submarkets.
We measure the eﬃciency of the economy by the number of matches.
Proposition 2 Introducing a middleman increases the number of matches.
Proof. In the coordinated submarket the number of matches is Mc = ρv ,i nt h e




. Then Mc+Ms−Mp = v
£
e−θ − (1 − ρ)e−σ¤
.I fθ>1 ,t h e nMc+Ms−Mp > 0
because σ>θ .If θ<1, using (4) and we obtain ∂
¡
e−θ − (1 − ρ)e−σ¢
/∂ρ = σe−σ > 0.
This says that putting up a coordinated market increases the number of matches, and
therefore Mc + Ms >M p.
Denote the workers’ and ﬁrms’ utilities in the economy with an intermediary by U
and V , respectively, and denote the utilities in a pure search economy by Up and Vp,
where Up = e−θ and Vp =1− e−θ − θe−θ.
7Proposition 3 (i) V> V p if and only if θ>1 because then σ>θ .O t h e r w i s eV<V p.
(ii) U>U p if θ<1, and U<U p if θ ≥ 2. If 1 ≤ θ<2,t h e nU<U p if α =1 ,a n dt h e
sign of U − Up is ambiguous if α<1.
Proof. (i) V>V p if and only if σ>θ ,which holds if and only if θ>1. Otherwise





e−σ −e−θ > 0 if θ<1 because σ<θ .If













(σ − θ)σe−σ =0 , σ
is decreasing in θ and larger than θ if θ<2,a n dσ is increasing in θ and smaller than









(σ − θ)σe−σ =0 .W h e nθ>2, then σ>θ .These things imply that when




(σ − θ)σe−σ < 0, and therefore U<U p .
Firms prefer an economy with an intermediary to the pure search economy if θ>
1,a n dv i c ev e r s ai fθ<1. The reason is that if θ>1, the job seeker - vacancy
ratio in the search market is larger than in a pure search economy. Introducing an
intermediary tightens the search market for workers, and it is just the market tightness
in the search market which determines the utilities of ﬁrms. Workers beneﬁtf r o mt h e
intermediary if θ<1 because the search market is less tight for them than it is in the
pure search economy. If a worker’s probability to propose a partition of output increases,
this diﬀerence increases further. If θ>2, workers are hurt by the introduction of an
intermediary whatever their probability to propose in the coordinated market, because
the search market becomes too tight for them. If 1 ≤ θ<2, the probability to make an
oﬀer in the coordinated market is weighted against a tighter search market, and the sign
of U − Up is ambiguous if α<1.
3 Monopolistic Intermediary and Entry of Firms
In many labor market matching models, it is a standard to assume that the number of
vacancies is endogenously determined by free entry and exit. In this section we assume
that vacancies can enter the market at an exogenous cost k>0. We assume that u is
constant. Then θ is endogenous. The agents make their choices in several stages as in
Section 2 except that immediately after the intermediary has announced f, ﬁrms enter
the market and pay k, and they decide whether to go to the coordinated market or to
the search market.
Entry and the choice between two submarkets ensure that a ﬁrm’s value is equal to
zero in both submarkets. Applying (3) and (5), the vacancies’ zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n sa r e
Vs = −k +1− e
−σ − σe
−σ =0 , (8)










8Firms’ entry cost determines the value of σ, the unemployment-vacancy ratio in the
search market. The larger k the less there are ﬁrms and the larger is σ.
The intermediary’s proﬁt maximization problem is given by (7) where he takes θ as





Proposition 4 The equilibrium market structure is ρ =
σ
1 − σ + σ2 where σ is deter-
mined by −k +1− e−σ − σe−σ =0 .







1+2 ρ − 3ρ2
´
,w h e r e1+2 ρ − 3ρ2 ≥ 0∀ρ ∈ [0,1]. This yields the
result.
The market structure is non-monotone in σ and thus non-monotone in k:I fσ<1,
which by (8) is true if k<1−2e−1,t h e nρ is increasing in σ and thus increasing in k .I f
σ>1, which is true if k>1 − 2e−1 ,t h e nρ is decreasing in σ and thus decreasing in k.
Proposition 5 The overall unemployment-vacancy ratio is θ =
2σ − 2σ2 + σ3
1 − σ + σ2 where σ
is determined by −k +1− e−σ − σe−σ =0 .
Proof. Use (4) and Proposition 4.
3.1 Welfare Analysis II
By free entry, a ﬁrm’s expected value is zero. Workers’ utility is, using (6) and Proposi-
tions 4 and 5, equal to U =
µ
(1 − α)σ2
2σ − 2σ2 + σ3 +1
¶
e−σ, which is decreasing in σ. Because
σ is increasing in k by (8), U is decreasing in k. The higher is k, the less ﬁrms ﬂow to
t h ee c o n o m y ,a n dt h em a r k e ti st i g h t e rf o rw o r k e r s .A ni n c r e a s ei nﬁrms’ probability of
making oﬀers in the coordinated market decreases U.
The appropriate measure of eﬃciency is now the number of matches minus the total
entry costs. The total net production is Q = Mc+Ms−vk = ρv+(1− ρ)v(1 − e−σ)−vk.
Proposition 6 If there is free entry of ﬁrms, the economy with an intermediary is more
eﬃcient than the pure search economy.
Proof. Using Propositions 4 and 5 we end up with Q =
(2σ − σ + σ2)e−σ
2 − 2σ + σ2 u. In a
pure search economy the unemployment-vacancy ratio ψ is determined by Vp = −k+1−
e−ψ − ψe−ψ =0 . But this and (8) imply that σ = ψ. T h et o t a ln e tp r o d u c t i o ne q u a l s
Qp = v(1 − e−σ)−vk = u(1 − e−σ − k)/σ. Using (8) we obtain Qp = e−σu.T h er e l a t i v e




2σ − σ + σ2
2 − 2σ + σ2 > 1 for all σ>0.
Comparing the expected utilities to those in an pure search economy is very simple:
9Proposition 7 (i) V = Vp =0by entry. (ii) U = Up if α =1,a n dU>U p if α<1.
Proof. (i) Straightforward, (ii) Up = e−ψ where ψ is determined by Vp = −k +1−





e−σ − e−ψ.B u tVp =0and (8) imply





e−ψ − e−ψ and the result follows.
Workers fare better in the economy with an intermediary than in a pure search econ-
omy. In the coordinated submarket they have a chance to propose a division of the
output, and if they fail to be hired there, the search submarket provides them the same
expected utility as the pure search economy.
4 Bertrand Competition Between Intermediaries
In the above models where the intermediary has monopoly power, it chooses the fee to
maximize proﬁt. This is equivalent to choosing the fraction of ﬁrms which participates
in the coordinated market. In this section we study competition between intermediaries.
We assume that they compete with prices, and this leads to zero proﬁts.
We consider an economy where the numbers of ﬁrms and workers are ﬁxed, and where
there is a “small” number of intermediaries. The order of events is the same as in the
monopolistic case. If a ﬁrm goes to the coordinated market, it is assumed to observe
all intermediaries’ fees, and it chooses intermediary i by the fee fi it announces. In
equilibrium all intermediaries charge the same fee. As the number of intermediaries is
“small” and the numbers of ﬁrms and workers are “large”, each intermediary receives
the same number of ﬁr m sa n dt h es a m en u m b e ro fw o r k e r s .W ea l s oa s s u m et h a te a c h
intermediary suﬀers cost c from each worker-ﬁrm pair it matches. Bertrand competition
leads to zero proﬁts, therefore f = c in equilibrium.
Proposition 8 The both submarkets exist if (i) c/α ≤ e−1 and (ii) θ ∈ (σ1,σ2) where σ1
and σ2 are solutions to σe−σ = c/α. If the both submarkets exist, the equilibrium market
structure is determined by ρ1 =
θ − σ1
1 − σ1




Proof. Firms’ indiﬀerence condition Vc = Vs implies f = ασe−σ, and intermediaries’
proﬁts are zero if f = c. This yields σe−σ = c/α, which has a solution only if c/α ≤ e−1
(which is the maximum of σe−σ). If c/α < e−1, then σe−σ = c/α has two solutions such
that σ1 < 1 <σ 2. Equation (4) gives ρ =
θ − σ
1 − σ
,a n dρ>0 only if σ1 <θ<σ 2.
The intermediary’s cost restricts the range of θ where both coordinated market and
search market exist. If the cost is large compared to ﬁrms’ probability of making an oﬀer
in the coordinated market, ﬁrms do not participate in that market. Firms’ participation
in the coordinated market increases in θ if θ<1, because σ1 < 1; it decreases in θ if
θ>1, because σ2 > 1.
104.1 The Eﬀects of c and α on Market Structure
The equilibrium market structure depends on the value of c/α:
Proposition 9 If the two markets exist, the fraction of ﬁrms which participates in the
coordinated market decreases in c/α.









2 > (<)0 if θ>(<)1.I f θ<1,















4.2 Welfare Analysis III
Let us ﬁrst study how the overall unemployment-vacancy ratio θ aﬀects the ﬁrms’ and
workers’ utilities. A ﬁrm’s value is equal to 1 − e−σ − σe−σ where σ solves σe−σ = c/α.
This implies that θ does not aﬀect ﬁrms’ value whenever θ ∈ (σ1,σ 2). If θ is outside
these limits, the coordinated market does not exist, and then ∂V/∂θ > 0.
A workers utility is, using (6) and
θ − σ
1 − σ
,e q u a lt oU =
µ









σ2 (1 − α)e−σ
θ
2 (1 − σ)
> (<)0 if σ<(>)1. This, in turn, implies that dU/dθ > 0
if θ<1,a n ddU/dθ < 0 if θ>1. The factor determining the change in utility is how
ρ/θ behaves as θ changes. If θ<1,t h e nρ increases with θ in such an amount that
d(ρ/θ)/dθ > 0,a n ddU/dθ > 0. If the unemployment-vacancy ratio increases, ﬁrms
increase their participation in the coordinated market so much that workers fare better.
If θ>1, ρ and θ change into the same direction, and an increase in θ makes workers
worse oﬀ.
The intermediary’s cost and the probabilities of making an oﬀer in the coordinated
market aﬀect the market structure. Therefore we expect that c and α aﬀect the utilities
of ﬁrms and workers, as well as the number of matches and the net production. If c/α
increases, σ1 increases and σ2 decreases. A ﬁrm’s value increases in σ, and we conclude
that dV/d(c/α) < 0 if θ>1,a n ddV/d(c/α) > 0 if θ<1. The latter result is
ﬁrst counterintuitive. However, if θ<1,a ni n c r e a s ei nc/α increases σ which is the
unemployment-vacancy ratio in the search submarket, and this is enough for making
ﬁrms better oﬀ.
If the intermediary’s cost increases, σ1 increases and σ2 decreases. An increase in
σ decreases a worker’s expected value in the search market, and as the search market
functions as an outside option in the coordinated market, it is clear that U decreases if
σ increases. We can conclude that dU/dc < 0 if θ<1,a n ddU/dc > 0 if θ>1.I f α
increases, σ1 decreases and σ2 increases. Then a worker’s expected value in the search
market increases in α if θ<1 , and it decreases in α if θ>1. The “direct” eﬀect of
a smaller probability for a worker of making an oﬀer in the coordinated market has a
negative impact on U.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t i f θ>1, both the direct eﬀect of larger α in
the coordinated market and the indirect eﬀect in the search market work in the same
11direction, decreasing U.B u ti fθ<1,t h ee ﬀects pull U into opposite directions, and the
sign of dU/dα is ambiguous.
L e tu sn e x tl o o ka th o wα and c aﬀect the number of matches and total net production.
By Proposition 9, it is clear that an increase in c/α results in less matches, because less
ﬁrms participate in the coordinated market. The net production per worker is ˆ Q =
1
θ
































θ<(>)1, and σe−σ ≥ c if the intermediary makes a nonnegative proﬁt.










dσ/dα < (>)0 if θ<(>)1, and σe−σ ≥ c if the intermediary makes a nonnegative proﬁt.
If ﬁrms’ probability of making an oﬀer in the coordinated market increases, more ﬁrms
choose this market, and this leads to more matches. Having more matches outweighs the
total increase in intermediaries’ costs.
It is not self-evident that an economy with an intermediary produces more net out-
put than a pure search economy because the intermediary has a cost from arranging
matches. If the cost is very high, having more matches can be outweighted by the
costs. The diﬀerence between the net outputs per worker in the two economies is
ˆ Q − ˆ Qp =
1
u








(ρ(1 − c)+( 1− ρ)(1− e−σ)) − (1 − e−θ)
¢





e−θ − (1 − ρ)e−σ¢
.
Proposition 10 ˆ Q> ˆ Qp if c<e −θ.




e−θ − (1 − ρ)e−σ¢
> 0.I f
















⎠. The derivative of this with respect
to ρ has the same sign as e−σ ¡
1 − ρ(1 − σ) − e−ρ(1−σ)¢
. The latter expression is negative




e−θ − (1 − ρ)e−σ¢
is decreasing in ρ. It is smallest when




e−θ − (1 − ρ)e−σ¢
= e−θ, and the result follows.
In a pure search economy, e−θ is the probability that a ﬁrm receives no applicants.
As each ﬁrm-worker pair produces a unit output, e−θ is the probability per ﬁrm that a
unit output is lost. In equilibrium an intermediary provides an immediate match for each
ﬁrm in the coordinate market. Whenever an intermediary’s cost is less then the expected
value of output lost, the intermediary institution is beneﬁcial.
12As to the comparison of ﬁrms’ and workers’ utilities to those in a pure search economy,
Proposition 3 states the results.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This article solves the equilibrium market structure in a labor market where agents can
meet in a coordinated market or in a search market. We studied the extreme cases
of competition between intermediaries: a monopoly and perfect competition. In the
monopoly case we showed that the relative size of the coordinated market depends on
the unemployment-vacancy ratio, being ﬁrst increasing in the ratio and then decreasing.
The unemployed-vacancy ratio is then endogenized by entry of ﬁrms, and the relative
size of the coordinated market is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in ﬁrms’ entry
costs. In both cases, introducing an intermediary increases the total output, but the
eﬀects on ﬁrms’ and workers’ utilities depend on the unemployment-vacancy ratio. If the
number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed, the short side of the market generally beneﬁts and the long side
of the market generally loses. With free entry, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between having an
intermediary or not, but workers gain if they have a positive probability to make an oﬀer
in the coordinated market.
Perfect competition among intermediaries implies that a coordinated market exists
only if the overall unemployment ratio is within certain limits. The fraction of ﬁrms which
participates in the coordinated market is determined by the ratio of intermediaries’ cost
and ﬁrms’ probability to make an oﬀer in the coordinated market. Finally, the eﬃciency
gain from having intermediaries depends on their unit cost.
We did not analyze a case where there is free entry of ﬁrms and perfect competition
among intermediaries. This is because there would be two independent conditions for the
unemployment-vacancy ratio in the search submarket: one given by the ﬁrms’ free entry,
and another one given by ﬁrms’ indiﬀerence between submarkets and the intermediaries’
zero proﬁt. These two conditions hold simultaneously only by chance.
6 Appendix
A1 Second-order condition for the middleman’s problem when θ>1 and
the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed
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dρ2 = e−σf0 (ρ)
g(ρ)
,w h e r ef0 (ρ)=3 ρ2 +2− 4ρ + θ
2 − 2θρ and g(ρ) < 0.T h e n
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.T h i si m p l i e st h a tf0 (ρ) > 0
at all ρ<1,a n df0 (ρ)=0at ρ =1 .T h i sr e s u l t si n
d2π
dρ2 < 0 at all ρ<1,a n d
d2π
dρ2 =0
at ρ =1 .The value of ρ that satisﬁes FOC satisﬁes also SOC, therefore ρ maximizes in-
termediary’s proﬁt. Because ρ(θ) is continuous and continuously diﬀerentiable for θ>1,
the value of ρ which gives a local maximum for π gives also global maximum.
A2 Second-order condition for the middleman’s problem when θ<1
and the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed
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1+ρ2 − (1 − ρ)
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.W eh a v ef0 (ρ) >
0 at all ρ<1 and f0 (ρ)=0at ρ =1 . This results in
d2π
dρ2 < 0 at all ρ<1,a n d
d2π
dρ2 =0
at ρ =1 .T h ev a l u eo fρ that satisﬁes FOC satisﬁes also SOC, therefore ρ maximizes in-
termediary’s proﬁt. Because ρ(θ) is continuous and continuously diﬀerentiable for θ<1,
the value of ρ which gives a local maximum for π gives also global maximum.
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